“I'm Worth More than That”: Trait Positivity Predicts Increased Rejection of Unfair Financial Offers by Dunn, Barnaby D. et al.
‘‘I’m Worth More than That’’: Trait Positivity Predicts
Increased Rejection of Unfair Financial Offers
Barnaby D. Dunn
1*, Dasha Makarova
2, David Evans
1, Luke Clark
2
1Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, UK Medical Research Council, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience Institute, Department of
Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
Abstract
Humans react strongly to unfairness, sometimes rejecting inequitable proposals even if this sacrifices personal financial
gain. Here we explored whether emotional dispositions - trait tendencies to experience positive or negative feelings – shape
the rejection of unfair financial offers. Participants played an Ultimatum Game, where the division of a sum of money is
proposed and the player can accept or reject this offer. Individuals high in trait positivity and low in trait negativity rejected
more unfair offers. These relationships could not be explained by existing accounts which argue that rejection behaviour
results from a failure to regulate negative emotions, or serves to arbitrate social relationships and identity. Instead, the
relationship between dispositional affect and rejection behaviour may be underpinned by perceived self worth, with those
of a positive disposition believing that they are ‘‘worth more than that’’ and those of a negative disposition resigning
themselves to ‘‘taking the crumbs from under the table’’.
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Introduction
Anyone who has witnessed siblings arguing over who rides in
the front seat of the car can attest to the fact that humans are
sensitive to fairness. Unfortunately our peers do not always treat us
fairly, for example making a below market value offer for a
property or proposing a less than reasonable pay rise, and we are
forced to weigh up the competing demands of economic self
interest versus social equity. How we respond to such inequity can
have significant personal, social and economic consequences, and
therefore it is important to understand the psychological
mechanisms which regulate individual differences in our responses
to unfairness. For example, in the current economic climate it
would be valuable to understand and predict how workers in the
broader economy will respond to pay freezes or cuts as the bonus
culture returns to the financial world.
The tradeoff between financial self interest and equity is
exemplified by economic choices in the Ultimatum Game (UG),
where a proposer makes a once only offer of how to divide a sum
of money, and a responder accepts or rejects the proposed
division. If the offer is accepted, the proposal is implemented, but if
the offer is rejected both players receive nothing. From a purely
selfish perspective, the responder’s ‘rational’ response is to accept
all offers, no matter how unfair – after all it is ‘free money’.
Nevertheless, most individuals reject inequitable UG offers [1].
In light of the realisation that decision making is driven by
emotional as well as rational factors [2], ‘irrational’ rejection
behaviour on the UG has been conceptualised as a failure of
negative emotion regulation. Individuals experience anger in
response to inequity, which is believed to override the econom-
ically sensible response of accepting whatever money is offered [3].
Principal evidence for this account is that activity in the right
anterior insula, a brain area implicated in aversive emotions such
as disgust and anger, is associated with greater rejection rates [4],
that inducing a negative mood increases rejection [5], and that
independent raters judge that participants are more angry
following offers that they go on to reject [3]. Depletion of the
neurotransmitter serotonin, which is implicated in emotional
regulation, also leads to increased rejection after unfair offers [6].
Similarly, patients with frontal lobe lesions, who often show anger
regulation difficulties, also display elevated rejection rates on the
UG [7–8].
Such findings highlight an important role for immediate
emotional reactions in accounting for departures from pure
financial rationality in economic decisions. However, as yet, we
know little about how longer-term emotional dispositions –
whether we tend to experience broadly positive or negative
emotions – impact on microeconomic behavior. A logical
extension of the emotion regulation account is that those of a
negative disposition will experience more state anger and therefore
will reject a greater proportion of unfair offers. In contrast, those
who are habitually positive will be less likely to reject in the face of
inequity, due to a relatively low tendency to experience state
anger. However, it is debated as to whether anger is best
conceptualized as an approach emotion (more often associated
with positive affect) or an avoidance emotion (more often
associated with negative affect). Indeed, evidence increasingly
links anger to activation of the approach system [9]. From this
perspective, one would expect greater rejection behaviour in those
of a positive as opposed to negative disposition. The primary aim
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relates to UG behaviour, and if any influence is mediated via
alterations in state anger experience.
So far we have focused on proximate, mechanistic accounts of
UG rejection behaviour (i.e. how affect at the time of the unfair
offer triggers rejection). A different class of explanation attends to
distal, functional consequences of rejection in the face of inequity.
From a social perspective, it may be advantageous to reject unfair
offers, as this helps preserve the individuals reputation as someone
who cannot be ‘messed around with’ and because it provides
negative social feedback to the proposer [10–11]. It is conceivable
that trait affect could also interact with these social mechanisms.
Those who are habitually positive may see themselves as having
high social status that they need to preserve (leading to greater
rejection in the face of inequity), whereas those of a negative
disposition may see themselves as low in the social hierarchy and
therefore will put up with unfair offers.
If trait emotion is functionally related to these social
mechanisms, both positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA)
should show a stronger relationship to offers proposed by a ‘real’
person rather than offers randomly generated by a computer
opponent, since the latter would not be relevant to the social
hierarchy. To explore this possibility, the second aim of the
present study was to examine the relationship between disposi-
tional affect and responses to both human and computer
generated unfair offers.
The final aim of the study was to examine whether dispositional
emotions may underpin recent findings of a relationship between
depression and reduced rejection of unfair offers on the UG [12].
At first glance this is a surprising result, given that depressed
individuals show elevated state negative affect and impaired
emotional regulation, and thus should reject more unfair offers.
However, it has been reliably demonstrated that depression is also
related to heightened dispositional NA and lower dispositional PA
[13], and as discussed above elevated trait positivity may relate to
increases in anger [9]. We also examine whether changes in UG
rejection behaviour are specific to depression or a marker of more
general psychopathology, giving the increasing realization that
comorbidity between depression and related conditions like
anxiety is the rule rather than the exception [14–15].
Materials and Methods
The experiment was approved by the Cambridge University
Psychology Research Ethics Committee, was conducted according
to principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki, and
participants gave written informed consent prior to taking part.
Volunteers were given an honorarium of £6 per hour for their
time and a contribution was made towards their travel expenses.
Participants (N=44; 32 female; mean age=37.75, SD=17.28;
mean estimated IQ=118.68, SD=8.82) were community volunteers
recruited via an established departmental volunteer panel. They
played the role of responder in 20 one shot UGs offering a division of
£10. Prior to playing as UG responders, the participants were asked
to propose five offers out of a £10 kitty and their photograph was
taken. They were told that their photo and offers would be presented
to future participants in the study. In turn, they were informed that
the offers they would go on to receive had been made by prior
volunteers in the study. This cover story was adopted to make it
believablethatthehumanoffersthatparticipantsreceived weremade
by real people, and to enable examination of the relationship of PA
and NA with proposal equity.
In the main task, there were 10 fair (£5) offers, 2 slightly unfair
(£3), 4 moderately unfair (£2) and 4 very unfair offers (£1).
Participants were instructed that half of each offer type were
proposed by other people, and half were proposed by the
computer (in reality, the offers were set by the experimenter and
were identical across all participants) (see Figure 1a). To increase
motivation, participants were instructed that one of their twenty
responder decisions would be chosen at random to be paid out on.
If they accepted this offer, both they and the proposer would
receive the proposed shares of the pot. If they rejected this offer,
neither player would receive any money.
After the UG task, participants rated how angry each offer type
made them feel, on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely).
We chose to rate anger retrospectively as we did not want to bias
participants’ behavioural decisions during the UG [3]. It is
plausible that the expression of anger via a rating immediately post
trial would serve to down-regulate anger to the extent that the
participant no longer felt the need to reject unfair offers.
We measured dispositional positive and negative affect using the
Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) [16]. This consists
of 20 self-report items, with 10 measuring dispositional positive
affect (PA; e.g. alert, strong, proud) and 10 measuring dispositional
negative affect (NA; e.g. irritable, hostile, ashamed). For each
adjective, participants rate to what extent they generally feel this
way, on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). PA and NA are
viewed as relatively independent affective dimensions [13]. In the
present sample, NA and PA were negatively related to one
another, r=2.44, P,.201. It has been argued that the phrase
‘affect’should be replaced with ‘activation’ in the PANAS, given
that PA relates to an approach related, and NA to a withdrawal
related, motivational system [17]. However, we continue to
employ the term ‘affect’ as this is more widely used in the
literature.
We additionally indexed levels of depression (using the Beck
Depression Inventory; BDI-II) [18] and anxiety (using the
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; STAI-T) [19]. Partic-
ipants’ full scale IQ was estimated using the National Adult
Reading Test [20] to ensure they were in the normal intelligence
range. The questionnaire measures were administered after the
UG and another experimental task not reported here, to minimise
any mood priming effects on behavioural performance. Table 1
reports the key UG and demographic variables for the sample.
At the end of the task participants were fully debriefed about the
deception elements of the design. Rather than receiving the
product of one of their twenty gambles selected at random,
participants instead all received an additional £5 reflecting a fair
division of the money.
Alpha is set at .05 and all statistical tests are two tailed. As
analyses are a priori motivated, no correction is made for multiple
comparisons. All variables were visually inspected for normality
prior to analysis and fell within acceptable statistical limits,
Kolmogorov Smirnov..01 in all cases. When exploring our first
aim (mechanistic affect accounts of UG rejection) human and
computer offers are pooled. When exploring our second aim
(functional social accounts of UG rejection) we examine human
and computer offers separately.
Results
Consistent with previous results, participants rejected 55%
(SD=33%) of unfair offers on average. This was greater than
rejections of fair offers (2%; SD=9%), t(43)=10.50, P,.001.
Participants tended to reject more human inequitable than
computer inequitable offers, t(43)=1.96, P=.06. This effect was
significant if restricted to the moderately unfair offers, t(43)=2.14,
P=.04, but not the slightly unfair, t(43)=1.16, P=.25, or very
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inducing more anger than fair offers, t(43)=7.18, P,.001, and
this was more marked for human than computer offers,
t(43)=3.56, P,.01.
Table 2 reports correlations between dispositional affect and the
UG task. Concerning our first aim, higher rejection of unfair offers
was strongly related to lower trait NA, Pearson’s r=2.42, P,.01,
and greater trait PA, r=.48, P,.01 (Figure 1b). The relationship
between unfair rejection rates and PA remained significant in
partial correlations when controlling for NA, rp=.36, P=.02, but
the relationship between NA and unfair rejections was not
statistically significant when controlling for PA, rp=2.26,
P=.09. This suggests that PA more strongly influences rejection
behaviour than NA.
To examine whether these dispositional effects were related to
state anger effects we also examined retrospective anger ratings
after unfair offers. Anger ratings of unfair offers were unrelated to
PA, r=2.03, P=.86, but were significantly related to NA,
r=2.36, P=.02. Crucially, the relationship of unfair rejection
rates with both PA, rp=.47, P,.01, and NA, rp=2.43, P,.01,
remained significant when controlling for anger ratings of unfair
offers. There was also no interaction between state anger and
Figure 1. Overview of the Ultimatum Game (a) and the relationship of PA and NA with rejection behaviour (b). (a) On each of 20 trials
participants attend to a fixation cross for 10 s, view a picture of the proposer or the computer for 10 s, the offer is presented for 10 s, and the
participant then decides to accept or reject the offer. Feedback is presented for 10 s. (b) Relationship of PA and NA to the proportion of unfair offers
that are rejected. As PA increases, participants reject more unfair offers. As NA increases, participants reject fewer unfair offers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015095.g001
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Fs,1. While inequitable offer rejection rates were not simply
related to anger ratings, r=.09, P=.55, this relationship was
significant when controlling for NA, rp=.29, P=.03, one tailed.
We also ran further analyses to examine if state anger mediated
the relationship between dispositional affect and UG behaviour
[21]. We used the SPSS procedure developed by Preacher and
Hayes [22], which both computes the Sobel indirect test and
provides a boot strapped estimate of the 95% confidence interval
of the indirect effect. Mediation is indicated by a significant Sobel
test and/or zero not falling within the bounds of the confidence
interval. We additionally report the boot strapped estimate as this
is more robust in the face of non-normality found in the
distribution typically observed in small samples. State anger did
not mediate the relationship between PA and unfair offer
rejection, 95% confidence interval = 2.004 to .004, Sobel
indirect test Z,1, or the relationship between NA and unfair
offers rejection, 95% confidence interval = 2.0004 to .013,
Z=1.44, P=.15.
This replicates previous findings of greater state anger being
related to rejection [3], but qualifies the effect by demonstrating its
dependency upon trait negative affect. Crucially, the relationships
between rejection behaviour and trait affect are independent from
state affect. Indeed, the state and trait effects go in opposite
directions to one another, with greater rejection being related to
elevated state negativity but heightened trait positivity. Further,
state affect did not significantly mediate the relationship between
rejection and a positive or negative emotional disposition.
To explore our second aim, we looked at the relationship of
dispositional affect to human and computer generated unfair
offers. As discussed above, putative social mechanisms [10–11]
should be more likely to exert an influence on decisions regarding
offers proposed by ‘real’ players rather than those randomly
generated by a computer. Therefore, if the effects of dispositional
affect are playing out through social feedback mechanisms, the
relationship of PA and NA with human unfair rejections should be
the most marked. PA was significantly positively related and NA
significantly negatively related to both human and computer
unfair offer rejection rates, all Ps,.05. Next, we compared the
magnitude of these correlations using the Williams test [23].
Crucially, there was no significant difference in the extent to which
PA was related to computer (r=.34) versus human (r=.50)
inequitable rejections, t,1, nor in the extent to which NA was
associated with computer (r=2.38) versus human (r=2.35)
inequitable rejections, t,1. Identical null results emerged if
contrasting human and computer correlations for slightly,
moderately, and very unfair offers in isolation, ts,1. Therefore,
the relationship between dispositional affect and UG rejection
behaviour is unlikely to be acting via social reputation and
feedback accounts.
Next, we examined our third aim of whether PA and NA
underpinned the associations previously reported between depres-
sion and reduced UG rejection [12]. As expected, depression
severity was associated with lower PA, r=2.49, P,.01, and
greater NA, r=.61, P,.001 [13]. Further, lower unfair rejection
rates were related to higher depression levels, r=2.32, P=.04.
When partialling out PA and NA this results was no longer
significant, rp=.03, P=.85. Moreover, these effects do not appear
to be specific to depression. STAI trait anxiety was also related to
lower PA, r=2.53, P,.001, greater NA, r=.80, P,.001, and
lower rejection rates, r=2.49, P,.001. Again, the relationship
between STAI trait anxiety and unfair rejection rates was no
longer significant when partialling out PA and NA, rp=2.16,
P=.32. The depression relationship to rejection behaviour was no
longer significant when controlling for trait anxiety, rp=2.05,
P=.74, while the anxiety relationship remained significant when
controlling for depression, rp=2.32, P=.04. This suggests that (in
a non-clinical population) anxiety is more clearly related to
rejection behaviour than depression symptoms, and that these
relationships may be underpinned by differences in dispositional
PA and NA.
We also attempted to rule out further alternative explanations of
the data. First, the observed PA relationship could not be simply
explained by greater sensitivity to fairness in more positively
disposed individuals, since there was no relationship between
ratings of the equitability of offers made to others in the proposal
phase and either PA, r=.05, P=.77, or NA, r=2.21, P=.18.
Further, statistically controlling for these offers did not alter the
key relationship of unfair rejection rates to PA, rp=.48, P,.01, or
NA, rp=2.40, P,.01. Second, given previous studies suggesting
that testosterone influences rejection behaviour and that this is
Table 1. Summary of key study variables.
Mean SD
PANAS positive 33.18 5.67
PANAS negative 17.55 5.72
Age 37.75 17.28
Estimated Full Scale IQ 118.68 8.82
Beck Depression Inventory II 6.93 4.78
Spielberger Trait Anxiety 37.49 10.65
Human inequitable offer rejection rate 60% 37%
Computer inequitable offer rejection rate 50% 39%
Human equitable offer rejection rate 1% 5%
Computer equitable offer rejection rate 3% 15%
Proposals offered to future players £4.60 £1.08
Anger to human inequitable offers 33.16 29.83
Anger to computer inequitable offers 21.53 26.76
Anger to human equitable offers 2.52 10.04
Anger to computer equitable offers 2.55 9.86
Anger rated on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015095.t001
Table 2. Relationships between Ultimatum Game rejection
rates, trait emotionality, and retrospective anger ratings.
PA NA Anger unfair
Unfair rejections .48** 2.42** .09
Human unfair rejections .50** 2.35** .20
Computer unfair rejections .34* 2.38** 2.03
Human fair rejections 2.03 .04 .17
Computer fair rejections .03 2.10 .32*
Proposals .05 2.21 .13
Anger unfair .03 .36*
Rejection rates are percentages of each offer type refused. Proposals = mean
offers made to other players. Anger unfair = average retrospective anger
ratings of human and computer unfair offers. Relationships are assessed using
Pearson’s correlation co-efficient. * = significant at P,.05. ** = significant at
P,.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015095.t002
Trait Positivity Predicts Reactions to Unfairness
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 December 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 12 | e15095higher in men than women [24–26], we also examined whether
there were gender effects on the UG. Neither mean proposals,
total rejections, computer unfair rejections, PA or NA significantly
differed between men and women, ts,1. However, men showed a
non-significant trend to reject more unfair human offers than
women, t(42)=2.02, P=.05. Therefore, we explored a possible
gender confound by repeating all analyses while additionally
covarying for gender, and an identical pattern of results emerged.
Third, we also found no significant relationship of proposal
magnitude or rejection rates for any offer type with age or
estimated full scale IQ, rs,.23, Ps..15, suggesting these
demographic variables cannot account for the present findings.
Finally, to investigate which aspects of PA and NA are
particularly related to rejection behaviour, we correlated UG unfair
offer rejections with individual item scores on the PANAS in
exploratory analyses (see Table 3). Of the PA items, interested,
strong, proud, determined and active were most strongly positively
related to rejection behaviour. Of the NA items, distressed, scared,
and afraid were most clearly negatively related to unfair offer
rejection rates. Moreover, the case has previously been made that
dispositional affect is related to self esteem [27]. For example, both
PA and NA are uniquely related to self esteem measures [28],
especiallyitemsthat relatetoselfconcept(e.g.‘proud’,‘strong’)[29].
Therefore, in additional analyses we pooled the subset of PA items
related to self esteem by Brown and Marshall [29], and contrasted
how clearly these were related to UG rejection behaviour compared
to the remaining PA items. Unfair rejection rates were related to
both the PA esteem items, r=.49, P,.001, and the other PA items,
r=.36, P=.02. The correlation between the esteem PA items
remained significant when controlling for the other PA items,
rp=.35,P=.02, but not vice versa, rp=.05, P=.77.
Discussion
Our findings demonstrate an important role for dispositional
emotionality in accounting for microeconomic behaviour. Trait
positivity (higher PA and lower NA) is related to greater rejection
rates of unfair offers on the UG. This contrasts to state emotion
effects, where induced negative emotion is associated with greater
rejection rates [5]. These dispositional findings cannot be simply
explained by existing emotion regulation [4] or social regulation
[10–11] accounts of UG behaviour, since dispositional affect did
not influence UG behaviour via fluctuations in state affect and
showed no differential relationship to human versus computer
unfair proposals.
The present results instead suggest a new explanation of UG
rejection behaviour is required. We hypothesise that rejection
behaviour is driven by internal self esteem. Individuals with high
PA may feel they are ‘‘worth more than that’’ and therefore reject
unfair offers. Individuals with high NA may feel they have no
choice but to ‘‘take the crumbs from under the table’’ and
therefore accept unfair offers.
Implicit in such an account is that rejection behaviour would
serve an important self esteem regulation function, whereby
rejecting an unfair offer maintains positive self regard and
accepting an unfair offer lowers positive self regard. Therefore,
there is self interest in rejecting an unfair offer, despite a monetary
personal cost, in that it can help maintain a positive self image. As
the fundamental function of this regulation is intra- rather than
inter-personal, one would expect this to be equally the case for
human and computer generated unfair offers. Clearly there would
be important evolutionary consequences of deciding to ‘‘accept’’
or ‘‘reject’’ in some circumstances. For example, choosing whether
Table 3. Relationships between individual PANAS items and rejection rates on the Ultimatum Game.
Total unfair rejections Human unfair rejections Computer unfair rejections
Interested .33* .32* .26+
Distressed 2.30* 2.29* 2.24
Excited .18 .19 .12
Upset 2.26+ 2.22 2.23
Strong .43** .51** .25
Guilty 2.22 2.16 2.22
Scared 2.45** 2.36* 2.41*
Hostile .00 .11 2.10
Enthusiastic .25+ .30* .15
Proud .43** .43** .32*
Irritable 2.10 2.06 2.11
Alert 2.03 2.02 2.03
Ashamed 2.25+ 2.20 2.25
Inspired .31* .23 .31*
Nervous 2.23 2.16 2.24
Determined .31* .34* .21
Attentive .22 .25 .14
Jittery 2.07 2.06 2.07
Active .34* .34* .26+
Afraid 2.37* 2.28+ 2.36*
Relationships are assessed using Pearson’s correlation co-efficient. + = trend significant at P,.10; * = significant at P,.05; ** = significant at P,.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015095.t003
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alone in the hope that a superior mate will later be available.
These data may also explain altered social decision-making in
clinical groups. The recent unexpected finding of decreased
rejection rates in individuals with clinical depression [12] makes
sense from the current account given that depressed groups
typically show lower PA and higher NA [13]. However, this effect
does not appear to be specific to depression, in that in the present
sample a relationship was also found between trait anxiety and
reduced rejection rates. Moreover, the depression relationship did
not hold when controlling for anxiety, whereas the anxiety
relationship did hold when controlling for depression. Of course,
this conclusion needs to be interpreted tentatively, given the non-
clinical nature of the present sample and requires replication in
those who are clinically anxious and depressed.
It is important to emphasise that our self esteem proposal is in
no way mutually exclusive to existing state affect or social accounts
of UG rejection. We simply show that the effect of trait affect on
UG rejection is independent of these other mechanisms. In our
view, it is likely that performance on the UG is multiply
determined by state affect, trait affect, social factors and a range
of other mechanisms. Individuals could plausibly differ with regard
to which of these mechanisms most influence their decisions.
Moreover, different situations may lead to one mechanism being
more salient than others. For example, when being watched or
when feedback will be delivered to the proposer, social factors may
come to the fore. Following a strong mood induction, state anger
factors may instead be more influential. Future research could
usefully examine how individual difference variables and manip-
ulating parameters of the UG in these ways influences different
underlying decision-making mechanisms.
There are a number of limitations to the present study which
need to be held in mind. First, we did not directly measure self
esteem using an established experimental measure. While the
PANAS has been previously associated with self esteem and
inspection of individual items showed the highest loading items
were self-referent, our self esteem hypothesis nevertheless remains
tentative until replicated with a specific measure of this construct.
In particular, here we measure the affective but not cognitive
components of self esteem [27–28]. Second, we rated anger
retrospectively to avoid biasing rejection decisions. However the
cost of this choice is that it introduces potential recall biases into
the data and may reduce the possibility that anger ratings will be
related to choice behaviour. We chose not to use the open ended
questions (e.g. ‘how do you feel’) after each trial employed by
Pillutla & Murninghan [3], as these might also have systematically
under-estimated anger due to their lack of specificity. Further,
participants may have used the ratings as a way of venting anger
and therefore reject less. Retrospective ratings have been used in
other studies, presumably for similar reasons [8]. It will
nevertheless be important to establish if similar results hold when
taking trial by trial state affect ratings. Third, completing the UG
may have then biased how participants filled in the questionnaire
measures. This seems plausible for state measures of mood.
However, we feel this is less likely with the measures used here.
The STAI-T and PANAS are trait (dispositional) measures and the
BDI-I measures mood over the past week.
In summary, rejection to unfair offers on the UG is related to
increased positive and decreased negative trait affect, supporting a
new self esteem account of individual differences in microeco-
nomic behaviour. There may be contemporary real world parallels
to the findings reported here. In the current economic climate,
many individuals in the broader economy are facing the prospect
of pay freezes or cuts, despite the bonus culture returning to the
banking world. In extreme cases, this has led to strikes and rioting
in Greece when stringent austerity measures were introduced. The
current account would predict high self esteem may make
individuals more likely to ‘walk’ when confronted with such
inequitable situations.
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